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LEGISLATORS LIVIN’ ON A PRAYER: THE FOURTH AND
SIXTH CIRCUITS’ APPLICATION OF TOWN OF GREECE ON THE
QUESTION OF LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER
Tori Gooder*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the words of Thomas Jefferson, the Establishment Clause was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."1
While the phrase may be simple, determining what that "wall" should
look like has been far from a simple task. The Supreme Court has spent
more than a century debating what that wall looks like between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Beginning with
Everson and continuing to Town of Greece, a plethora of tests have
formed, and yet not one precedential standard to evaluate Establishment
Clause cases rules.2 In the recent circuit split between the Fourth Circuit
and Sixth Circuit, the two courts struggle with this complex
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to answer the question whether
legislators themselves may lead prayer.
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits emerge with seemingly different
holdings about the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer, despite
having extremely similar facts. In Lund v. Rowan City, the Fourth
Circuit held the County's Board of Commissioners' longtime practice of
leading prayers themselves violated the Establishment Clause.3 On the
other hand, in Bormuth v. City of Jackson, the Sixth Circuit found the
County's Board of Commissioners' tradition of leading prayers
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.4 Both circuits agree that
legislator-led prayer is not per se unconstitutional and apply at least the
surface level law of Marsh and Town of Greece correctly.5 The
difference in the holdings lies in the Sixth Circuit's mischaracterization
of Town of Greece's deeper holding: courts must look beyond the
contents of the prayers and the identity of the prayer-giver and instead
focus on the motivation and intentions behind the prayer-giver's
invocations. The Sixth Circuit strategically avoids facts vital to the
constitutional inquiry of the prayer-giver's motivations by considering
the prayers in a vacuum and dismissing the relevant facts through a
*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811,1819 (2014).
863 F.3d 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2017).
870 F.3d 494, 509 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Lund, 863 F.3d at 279; Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509.
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procedural ruling.
This article explores the complicated Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and its involvement in the recent circuit split over
legislator-led prayer. First, this article outlines the evolution of
Establishment Clause case law, highlighting the ideological movements
that shift the Supreme Court from strict separationists to
accommodationists. Next, the article will investigate the doctrinal
starting point for which Marsh and Town of Greece set the foundation
for both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits to evaluate legislator-led prayer.
In light of both Marsh and Town of Greece, the article will then explain
the analysis and holdings of the Fourth and Sixth Circuit. Finally, the
article will discuss the circuits’ correct and incorrect holdings and
application of Town of Greece’s requirement that courts scrutinize the
motivations and intentions of the prayer-givers or the prayer policies in
legislative prayer cases. Although the Fourth Circuit correctly applies
Town of Greece’s true holding, the Sixth Circuit cannot hide its failure
to investigate the prayer-giver’s motives nor their obvious attempt to
shield the appellate record from facts that expose the commissioners’
prohibited motivations for prayer. The Supreme Court will most surely
see through the façade of applying the surface level of Marsh and Town
of Greece’s precedence. Unfortunately, until then, the lower courts are
left with a circuit split based on a procedural hoax and feigned
dissidence.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is littered
with a myriad of tests, plurality opinions, and seemingly contradictory
holdings. Much of the confusion can be attributed to the tension that
exists between two fundamental First Amendment rights: the right
protecting citizens from the establishment of a government endorsed
religion and the right to have freedom of religion.6 These almost
paradoxical clauses of the First Amendment have led to years of
controversy over prayer, Christmas decorations, and government
funding to private schools. For purposes of this article, the evolution of
Establishment Clause case law will set up a framework to understand
the foundation of the recent circuit split on whether legislator-led prayer
is constitutional. In addition, the review of Marsh and Town of Greece
will lay the foundation from which the circuits begin their analysis.

6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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A. The Evolution of Establishment Clause Tests: Shifting Ideologies
The evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence appears
nonsensical. However, the underlying ideological camps of the justices
throughout the century, exposes the shifts between Establishment Clause
tests. Establishment Clause cases fall into one of three categories based
on the ideological undertones of the Supreme Court Justices of the time.
The Supreme Court, under Justice Burger, for years held a strict
separationist view and continued to build a high and impregnable wall
of separation between church and state.7 Then the era of the Reaganappointed Justices shifted the Court a little more “right” to the age of
neutrality and endorsement.8 During this time, the court transitioned
from the separationist viewpoint that no aid, no relationship, and no
commingling between church and state may exist to a more flexible
approach that substantial aid or substantial commingling may exist
between church and state, as long as it is neutral and does not endorse a
particular religion. Later, the Supreme Court relaxed their Establishment
Clause jurisprudence further holding that the state and the church may
be substantially intertwined provided that citizens do not feel coerced by
the state.
1. The Time of Strict Separationists: The Birth of the Lemon Test
In 1947, Everson v. Bd. of Education commenced the Supreme
Court’s separationist Supreme Court era. The Supreme Court narrowly
upheld a municipal community's decision to subsidize public
transportation to and from parochial schools, but it unanimously held a
staunch position that church and state should be completely and
uncompromisingly separate.9
Engel v. Vitale echoed Everson's strict separationist viewpoint.10 In
Engel, the Supreme Court held that “it is no part of the business of the
government to compose official prayers,” and therefore, students
reciting prayers every day before school is an “indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities” in violation of the Establishment Clause.11
Before 1971, the Supreme Court had a "consistency in the way the
Justices went about deciding the case... Neither side rested on any facile
application of the 'test' or any simplistic reliance on the generality or
7. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
8. Id. at 233.
9. Id.; see generally Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 1 (1947) (upholding the statute to
protect the rights of religious-school students under the Free Exercise Clause).
10. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-431 (1962).
11. Id. at 425, 431 (explaining that public schools forcing students to recite prayers every day
before school is in violation of the Establishment Clause).
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evenhandedness of the state law."12
In 1971, Lemon v. Kurtzman developed a three part test to apply to
Establishment Clause cases: (1) the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose, (2) the primary effect of the statute must not be to
advance nor inhibit a particular religion, and (3) the statute must not
enable excessive government entanglement with religion.13 The
Supreme Court in Lemon also seemed to create a fourth factor in the
Establishment Clause analysis: the effect of the statute on political
divisiveness.14 The Lemon Test marks the start of the Burger Court's
effort to be less doctrinal about the separation of church and state, and
more concerned about the effects the statute has.15 In other words, if the
effects of the statute are not neutral, but instead endorse a particular
religion, then, and only then, will the statute be in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
While the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente completely ignored the
Lemon Test, the Court focused again on the effect of the statute, and
whether the statute endorsed or preferred a specific religion.16 The
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and held that “[t]he clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”17
In 1983, Marsh v. Chambers followed suit, and also did not apply the
Lemon Test, but instead carved out an exception to the Establishment
Clause for legislative prayer cases.18 The Supreme Court held that in
legislative prayer cases the Lemon Test should not apply, but instead
courts should interpret the Establishment Clause in light of the historical
and traditional practices of legislative prayer.19
2. The Neutrality and Endorsement Era: The Reagan Justices’
Revolution
Marsh was decided on the cusp of the Reagan Justices–Justice Scalia,
O'Connor, and Kennedy—and clearly repudiated the years of
separationists structure by carving out an exception within

12. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 876 (2000) (quoting Souter, J., dissenting).
13. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (finding state aid to religious schools creates excessive
government entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause).
14. Id. at 622.
15. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools after Lee v. Weisman: Lemon is
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. 795, 804-05 (1993).
16. 456 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1982).
17. Id. at 244.
18. 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
19. Id.
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Establishment Clause case law.20 Like Larson and Marsh, Lynch v.
Donnelly shoved the Lemon Test aside, and instead focused on whether
the statute endorsed a particular religion.21 While the majority in Lynch
chose not to use the Lemon Test, the undertones of Lemon's shift from
separationism to the effects of the statute appeared to be at play. Gaining
momentum from Lemon's nudge, Lynch and Marsh illustrate the Court's
self-conscious push from separationist to the effect of the statute on the
community it governs.22
The exception carved out in Marsh caused much confusion for the
Supreme Court Justices in the 1989 case, Allegheny County v. ACLU.23
In the dictum of Allegheny, the Justices disagreed about Marsh’s
application beyond legislative prayer, as well as whether the prayers
must be non-sectarian.24 Without guidance as to Marsh's scope, the
Supreme Court fell back onto Lynch's use of the endorsement test: if the
statute is "sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices," then the statute
will be in violation of the Establishment Clause.25
The Supreme Court reexamined on the Lemon Test in McCreary
County v. ACLU.26 The majority interpreted the first prong of the Lemon
Test to necessitate a neutrality principle, in which the secular purpose of
the statute must predominate over any other purpose.27 The majority
held that the evaluation of this predominance is by an objective
observer, while Justice O’Connor suggests the evaluation be based on
whether a reasonable observer would view an unmistakable message of
endorsement by the government.28 By this point, the Supreme Court
completely replaced separationism with nonendorsement and
neutrality.29 Most of the Justices lie in the ideological camp where the
state may have substantial involvement in religious aid and religious
20. Lupu, supra note 7, at 230-33.
21. 465 U.S. 668, 678-82 (1984).
22. Lupu, supra note 7, at 239-40.
23. 492 U.S. 573, 602-10 (1989).
24. Id. (writing for the majority in Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy answers the disagreements
highlighted in Allegheny over Marsh’s scope and holds that nonsectarian prayer is not dispositive in
legislative prayer cases).
25. Id. at 597 (discussing the religious symbol of the creche, the majority believed “regardless of
history, government may not demonstrate a preference for a particular faith,” and therefore found the
creche displayed on the steps of a courthouse to be unconstitutional. Id. at 605).
26. 545 U.S. 844, 859-60 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 862, 883-84 (writing a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test first materializes and appears to be adopted by the majority in Allegheny. 465 U.S. at
688).
29. Lupu, supra note 7, at 240.
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symbols, as long as the effect on the community does not appear to be
endorsing a particular religion.
3. The Coercion and Accommodation Age: The Death of Separationism
In 1992, the Supreme Court took one step further towards
conservatism through the creation of the coercion test. Justice Kennedy
created the coercion test in Lee v. Weisman to distinguish legislative
prayer in Marsh from public school prayer.30 Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the coercion or social pressure a student might feel
from the government to support or to participate in religion during a
student’s graduation ceremony is very different than an adult’s position
during a state legislature opening prayer session where that adult may
easily enter and leave for a myriad of reasons.31 The coercion test was
re-applied in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe to invalidate a
pre-game prayer practice led by students before high school football
games.32
Similar to the neutrality and endorsement tests, the coercion test
allows the state to have substantial involvement in religious aid and
symbols. However, the ideological undertones of the coercion test
moved the focus further from separationists (even more than the
neutrality and endorsement view) to the effect of the state's message on
the individual within the community, in order to accommodate the
individual's conscience.33
Therefore, under the coercion and
accommodation ideology, the state may have substantial involvement in
religious aid and religious symbols, as long as the state's involvement is
not putting pressure on the individual. What that "pressure" looks like is
up for debate.34 Justice Kennedy believes the pressure or coercion can
be from society itself, while Justice Thomas suggests it can only be of a
legal nature.35 Like most Establishment Clause tests, the use of the
coercion test has been inconsistent. In fact, this coercion test leads to a
plurality opinion in Town of Greece.36
The Supreme Court has slowly transitioned from a strict separationist
30. 505 U.S. 577, 592-94 (1992).
31. Id. at 596-97.
32. 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (arguing that the policy of students partaking in an election on
whether to keep the pre-game prayer encouraged divisiveness along religious lines in a public school
setting).
33. Lupu, supra note 7, at 241.
34. See generally Ronald C. Kahn, Religion and the Public Schools after Lee v. Weisman: God
Save Us from the Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking, Polity Principles, and Religious
Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES. 983 (1993).
35. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93; see Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1838 (2014).
36. 134 S. Ct. at 1814.
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view of the relationship between the state and religion to a more flexible
view of the relationship between the individual and state.37
Distinguishing the three ideological camps of the Justices over the
decades allows for a better understanding of the various tests: the
Lemon Test, the coercion test, the endorsement test, and Marsh’s
historical test. The disagreement over which test to apply is exposed in
Marsh and Town of Greece’s majority, dissenting, and concurring
opinions.38
B. Marsh and Town of Greece: Setting the Doctrinal Starting Point
This article focuses on the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer in
light of the Establishment Clause. The lower courts only have two
Supreme Court cases to lead them through the complex and fact-specific
path: Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway.39 However,
neither of these cases are concerned specifically with legislator-led or
lawmaker-led prayer. Yet Marsh and Town of Greece provide the
foundation from which both the Fourth Circuit and Sixth Circuit begin
their analyses.
The first case that dealt with prayer in a legislative context was
Marsh.40 In Marsh, the Court held that legislative prayer can be
constitutional in light of historical and traditional practices, as long as
the legislative prayers do not proselytize or advance a specific religion
or disparage another.41 Thirty years later, the Court reaffirmed Marsh’s
holding in Town of Greece that sectarian prayer is not per se
unconstitutional.42 Following the history and traditions analysis in
Marsh, the Supreme Court in Town of Greece held that the
Establishment Clause does not require legislative prayer to be
nonsectarian or ecumenical.43 Moreover, the Court determined that
generally, “a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not
likely establish a constitutional violation.”44
Marsh involved the Nebraska legislators’ routine of opening their
meetings with a chaplain-led prayer.45 While a new chaplain could be
selected every two years, this particular chaplain had been leading the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Lupu, supra note 7, at 250.
See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1811.
Id.
463 U.S. at 794-95.
Id.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1820 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 1824.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1983).
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prayers for sixteen years and had been paid with public funds.46 The
Court in Marsh momentarily reflected on the test outlined in Lemon,
before setting Marsh into its own distinct category involving legislative
prayer.47 Because legislative prayer is “embedded in the history and
tradition of this country,” the Court held the Nebraska legislative prayer
practice must be evaluated in light of the historical and traditional
legislative prayer practices our country has engaged in since its
founding.48 The Court weighed heavily on the fact that the same
Congress that established the language of the First Amendment, just
three days earlier, had authorized the appointment and payment of
chaplains to open its legislative sessions with prayer.49 A legislature’s
wish to “invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of
religion or a step toward establishment.”50 Therefore, the Supreme Court
held that, in light of historical and traditionally tolerated legislative
prayer practices, the Establishment Clause was not violated in this
case.51
Town of Greece expounded on Marsh’s holding, yet added its own
confusing dicta to the Establishment Clause analysis.52 Unlike the
situation in Marsh, the town of Greece invited local clergy, as unpaid
volunteers, to open its monthly meeting in prayer.53 The clergy were
predominantly Christian due to the fact that most local congregations
were Christian.54 However, the town did not exclude or deny volunteers
an opportunity to give a prayer.55 Two residents who attended the
monthly board meetings brought a complaint to the board about the
prayers being predominantly Christian in content.56 In direct response to
the complaints, the town invited a Jewish layman, a chairman of a local
Baha’i temple, and a Wiccan priestess to offer invocations before the
monthly meetings.57
The two residents, Galloway and Stephens, brought a suit against the
town, alleging that the town’s opening prayers did not fall within the
historical and traditional practices outlined in Marsh because of the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793-95.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818-20 (2014).
Id. at 1816.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1817.
Id.
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sectarian language or messages in the prayers and because of the social
pressures the town meetings created.58 In order to rectify these alleged
Establishment Clause violations, Galloway and Stephens sought “an
injunction that would limit the town to ‘inclusive and ecumenical’
prayers that referred only to a ‘generic God’ and would not associate the
government with any one faith or belief.”59
The Supreme Court rejected Galloway and Stephen’s arguments that
the town’s prayers must be nonsectarian. Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, clarified Marsh’s history and traditions test.60 The Court’s
analysis should not be based on whether a generic God or theism is
central to the prayers, but on whether “our history and tradition have
shown that prayer in this limited context could ‘coexis[t] with the
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.’”61 Justice
Kennedy held the neutrality element that Galloway and Stephens
requested was not consistent with Marsh, but was derived from dicta
from other Establishment Clause cases not addressing legislative
prayer.62 In fact, the Court stated that a neutrality requirement in
legislative prayer would expand the governments’ and courts’
involvement in religious matters to a worse degree than the situation at
hand.63
Yet, this does not mean that legislative prayer does not have
constraints on its content. If the prayers deviate from their intended use
— “to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values long part of the
Nation’s heritage”— then a different outcome might emerge.64
However, in town of Greece’s situation, the town made reasonable
efforts to reach beyond its major congregations to bring diversity to the
invocations.65 Therefore, the majority appeared to require the courts to
look beyond the prayers content, to the intentions and motivations
behind the prayer-giver before prayers amount to an Establishment
violation.66
While the first half of Justice Kennedy’s opinion sheds light on
Marsh’s “history and tradition” analysis, the second half of the opinion
muddies the Establishment Clause waters as only two other Justices join

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1818.
61. Id. at 1820.
62. Id. at 1821; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-603 (1989).
63. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014).
64. Id. at 1823.
65. Id. at 1824.
66. Id.; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Intentional Discrimination in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 ALA. L. REV. 299, 301 (2015).
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this part of his opinion.67 Drawing on past cases, Justice Kennedy
pointed to both Allegheny and Van Orden to illustrate the fundamental
principle in First Amendment cases that the government not coerce its
citizens “to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”68
However, the plurality opinion found no such coercion in this case.69
The plurality opinion directed attention to the fact-sensitive aspects of
the case: the setting where the prayer is given and the audience present.
Due to the historical and traditional nature of legislative prayer, “[i]t is
presumed that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this tradition
and understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public
proceedings….”70 Nothing in the record about the setting of the town of
Greece’s prayers compromises this presumption to the reasonable
observer.71 Similar to Marsh, the audience is not the public, but the
present lawmakers who exercise an “internal act” directed to their “own
members” during legislative prayer in order to implore the divine, not to
promote one religion above another.72
While Justice Kennedy’s three-justice plurality opinion stated that in
this case there was no coercion, he cautioned that the analysis would be
different if (1) “town board members directed the public to participate in
the prayers” (2) “town leaders allocated benefits and burdens based on
participation in the prayer,” or (3) "town leaders signal disfavor toward
nonparticipants or suggest that their stature in the community was in any
way diminished.”73 Justice Thomas’s two-justice concurring opinion
emphasized the coercion must be of a legal nature, not just societal
pressures.74 Neither Galloway’s nor Stephen’s offense, or feelings of
disrespect, equal coercion from the town. Unlike the situations in Lee or
Santa Fe Independent School District, the citizens were not hindered
from arriving later in the meetings after the prayers, leaving during the
prayers, or speaking to the town leaders about more diverse prayers.75

67. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014).
68. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 677, 683
(2005) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that our “institutions must not press religious observances upon
their citizens” Id.).
69. Id. at 1825.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1826.
74. Id. at 1837-38.
75. Id. at 1827; see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290 (2000).
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C. Lund and Bormuth: The Circuit split on Legislator-Led Prayer
The biggest factor that distinguishes Lund v. Rowan City and
Bormuth v. County of Jackson from Marsh and Town of Greece is the
identity of the prayer-giver. Marsh and Town of Greece do not touch
much on prayer specifically led by legislatures or public officials
themselves. Yet Town of Greece prompts courts to conduct a “factsensitive” review of the particular prayer practice when the historical
principles established by the Supreme Court do not direct a specific
result.76 Therefore, both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit begin their “factsensitive” analysis from Marsh and Town of Greece’s “doctrinal starting
point.”77
1. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lund
Unlike Marsh and Town of Greece, the prayer-givers in Lund were
the Commissioners themselves.78 There were five members of the Board
of Commissioners who met twice a month to hold board meetings in
front of community members.79 During these meetings, one of the five
commissioners led a prayer of his or her choosing.80 The prayer-giver
usually asked everyone to stand up, bow their heads, and join in
prayer.81 Over the last five years, ninety-seven percent of the
commissioners’ prayers referenced “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Savior,” along
with other Christian content.82 Some board meeting prayers requested
forgiveness on behalf of the whole community and other prayers
requested attendees to accept Christianity.83 After the prayers, the
meetings continued with the Pledge of Allegiance, a public comment
time, and an addressment of the matters on the agenda for the evening.84
When both complaints were made about the prayers and the ACLU of
North Carolina notified the board about their potential Establishment
76. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (plurality opinion).
77. Lund v. Rowan City., N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 2017).
78. Id. at 272.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 273.
81. Id. at 272.
82. Id. at 273.; see, e.g., S.A. 14 (prayer of April 21, 2008) ("I ask all these things in the name of
Jesus, the King of Kings and the Lord of Lords. Amen.").
83. Lund, 863 F.3d at 273.; see, e.g., S.A. 30 (prayer of August 1, 2011) ("Lord, we confess that
we have not loved you with all our heart, and mind and strength, and that we have not loved one another
as Christ loves us. We have also neglected to follow the guidance of your Holy Spirit, and have allowed
sin to enter into our lives."); see also, e.g., S.A. 21 (prayer of October 5, 2009) ("Father, I pray that all
may be one as you, Father, are in Jesus, and He in you. I pray that they may be one in you, that the
world may believe that you sent Jesus to save us from our sins.").
84. Lund, 863 F.3d at 272.
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Clause violation, individual commissioners stated they would continue
to start the board meetings with prayer for the benefit of the Rowan
community.85 The prayers became so controversial that they appeared in
the platforms of two incumbents in the 2016 board elections.86
The Fourth Circuit begins its analysis of Lund by distinguishing it
from Marsh and Town of Greece in two ways. The most obvious being
that in both Marsh and Town of Greece the prayer-givers were guest
clergy or ministers, while in Lund the prayer-givers were the legislators
themselves.87 Because the prayer opportunities were reserved only for
the legislators, the Fourth Circuit believed that the commissioners
created a “closed universe” of prayer-givers.88 While these facts alone
might not be outcome-determinative, the Fourth Circuit held that the
“combination of legislators as the sole prayer-givers, official invitation
for audience participation, consistently sectarian prayers referencing but
a single faith, and the intimacy of a local government setting” go beyond
the historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer.89 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit held that under a “fact-sensitive” constitutional
inquiry, Rowan City’s prayer practices, taken as a whole, exceeded the
constitutional limits established in Marsh and Town of Greece.90
Beginning similarly to Marsh and Town of Greece, the Fourth Circuit
reflected on the past historical and traditional practices of prayer led by
the legislators or public officials themselves.91 The Circuit cited
multiple instances when legislators or public officials have led prayer.
However, the Circuit found this to be the exception. Most instances
illustrate legislators leading prayer as an occasional practice to the more
consistent practice of chaplains leading the prayer.92 For example,
Congress gives Senators, from time to time, the opportunity to deliver
the prayer.93 However, more often, Congress invites guest ministers and
clergy to deliver the prayers or invocations.94 Here, for the Fourth
Circuit, lies the threat to the Establishment Clause: Rowan City does not
extend the opportunity to lead prayer to the lawmakers, but instead
reserves the opportunity to lead the prayer exclusively for the
lawmakers.95
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Importantly, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that not all legislator-led
prayer is “inherently unconstitutional.”96 Instead, the Court wished to
establish that the identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the “factsensitive” constitutional inquiry in Establishment Clause cases.97 Due to
the identity of the prayer-givers as legislators, Rowan City not only set
an exhaustive list of prayer-givers, but created an environment in which
the prayers were composed and tailored to the sectarian beliefs each
commissioner held.98 In this case, the single faith represented by the
commissioners in their prayers was Christianity.99 The Fourth Circuit
found the prayer-giver restriction to be in direct contrast with Marsh and
Town of Greece. The ability of lawmakers to invite ministers and clergy,
the Fourth Circuit believes, allows the legislators to accommodate
diverse religions. Instead, Rowan restricted prayer practice creating an
intolerant and “closed universe” that the Fourth Circuit viewed as an
advancement of a single faith.100
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit viewed Rowan’s exclusive prayer
practice as posing a risk to the political process within the city. Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit believed the risk of political division had already
begun. During one meeting, the individual who initially complained
about the prayers was openly mocked.101 In addition, the prayers became
a campaign issue in the most recent board elections.102 The court
reflected on the Supreme Court’s warning in Lemon that “political
division along religious lines…is a threat to the normal political
process,” and is “one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect.”103
The Fourth Circuit insisted that due to the Rowan City’s exclusive
prayer practice, it has “link[ed] itself persistently and relentlessly to a
single faith.”104 One religion cannot be officially preferred over another.
The Fourth Circuit suggested that the “reasonable observer” familiar
with the history and tradition of legislative prayer would easily view this
preference of Christianity through the sectarian prayers that sometimes
invited observers to embrace Christianity as the sole road to salvation.105
Citing Town of Greece, the Fourth Circuit assigned importance to the
fact that the “town board members directed the public to participate in
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 283 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)).
Id. at 284-87.
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the prayers” as potentially dispositive of Rowan’s prayer practice
exceeding the constitutional limits of legislative prayer.106
Last, the Fourth Circuit entertained Justice Kennedy’s plurality
suggestion in Town of Greece to consider “the setting in which the
prayer arises.”107 Because the prayers were delivered at public meetings
which are led by a local government body, the “close proximity”
between the legislator-led prayers and the deliberation of certain
individual community members’ appeals made the court very
uncomfortable.108 The Fourth Circuit feared this “close proximity”
provided an avenue for abuse by the commissioners to deliberate issues
not on the merits of the petition, but on whether the individual joined in
the prayers.109
2. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bormuth
The prayers in Bormuth were extremely similar to the prayers
complained about in Lund, yet the Sixth Circuit came out opposite of the
Fourth Circuit.110 Exactly like Lund, the prayer-givers in Bormuth were
one of the nine individuals on the Jackson County Board of
Commissioners.111 The meetings began with the boards’ chairman
asking attendees to stand and bow their heads and proceed with one of
the commissioners leading the prayer.112 Similar to Lund, the Pledge of
Allegiance was offered after the prayer and then the board conducted its
usual business.113 The prayer contents tended to be Christian.114
However, the prayer was on a rotating basis between the nine
commissioners, who have the freedom to lead the invocation however
they please.115
The plaintiff first complained of the prayers during an open comment
period of the meeting.116 During his complaint, one of the
commissioners turned his chair so that his back faced the plaintiff,

106. Id. at 287 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014)) (emphasis
added by the Fourth Circuit).
107. Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825).
108. Id. at 288.
109. Id.
110. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc opinion).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. For example, “[s]ome prayers ask for blessings for others, from county residents suffering
particular hardships, to military members, first responders serving in Jackson County, and others.” Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 499.
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which the plaintiff stated offended and insulted him.117 The plaintiff
feared that due to his complaint, the board would now discriminate
against him during the County’s dealings.118 After his complaint, the
plaintiff brought a suit against the County.119 Not long after his
commencement of litigation, the plaintiff desired appointment to the
County’s new Solid Waste Planning Committee.120 However, he did not
receive a nomination from the board to the committee and later amended
his complaint against the County to reflect this alleged prejudice against
him.121
The Sixth Circuit first addressed a procedural issue that is worth
noting.122 The factual recitation before the Sixth Circuit does not include
comments made, and recorded in videos, by the commissioners before
and after litigation commenced.123 Since no video evidence of these
public recordings of the board of commissioners' meetings were
presented to the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held it "will not
entertain on appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court
when reviewing a district court's decision."124 These videos, highlighted
in Americans United for Separation of Church and State's amicus brief,
included recordings of board meetings over a two year span all of
which began with a prayer lead by one of the commissioners, except for
the one meeting no citizens were in attendance.125 The video recordings
also captured comments made by the commissioners in reaction to the
litigation.126
Just as the Fourth Circuit in Lund, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis
with Marsh and Town of Greece as the foundation.127 However, unlike
the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit found legislator-led prayer to be far
from an exception to the rule.128 Citing many of the amicus briefs

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 500 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Corp v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007)).
125. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. United for Separation of Church and State In Support of
Appellant and Reversal at 10, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F. 3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017).
126. Id. at 26. For example, one of the commissioners told the Plaintiff: "It's taken some nitwit
200 and some years to come up with an angle like this to try to deprive me or other people of my faith,
of my rights." Id. (quoting County of Jackson, Personnel and Finance Committee November 12, 2013
Jackson County, MI, YouTube (Dec. 19, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/2013nov12 (43:00)). During another
meeting one commissioner declared the lawsuit was not "just an attack on us, it's an attack on
Christianity, and it's an attack on our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ." (Id. at 33:28).
127. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2017).
128. Id. at 509-510.
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submitted, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated “the historical breadth of
legislator-led prayer in the state capitals for over one hundred fifty
years.”129 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the historical breadth to include
guest ministers or legislator-appointed chaplains, as either prayer-giver
is consistent with the traditional and modern practice of legislators
leading prayers.130 In light of the historical and traditional practices, the
Sixth Circuit viewed legislator-led prayer to be no different than
legislator-authorized prayer as both instances fill our history and
traditions.131
In addition to Jackson County’s prayer practice coinciding with the
historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer, the Sixth Circuit
held the prayers within the limits of Town of Greece’s constraints: the
content of the prayers should not preach conversion, disparage
minorities, advance a single faith, or “betray an impermissible
government purpose.”132 While the prayers were predominately
Christian, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit did not view the
Commissioners as preferential to one religion over another.133 The Sixth
Circuit pointed to the County’s prayer policy to illustrate that the
County permits prayers of all faiths or no faith.134 The commissioners
elected at that time choose what prayers to compose; the board had no
influence over the content of the prayers.135 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit
viewed the religious makeup of the commissioners to be irrelevant and
immaterial to the legislative prayer analysis. Instead, citing Town of
Greece, the Sixth Circuit believed that the relevant and material factors
are the policies dictating the prayers content.136 And therefore, the Sixth
Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation that “Town of
Greece’s holding is dependent upon religious heterogeneity,” because it
believes that Marsh and Town of Greece do not require the board to
provide opportunities to people of other faiths.137
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit found Justice Kennedy’s
plurality suggestion to consider “the setting in which the prayer arises
and the audience to whom it is directed” useless as Jackson County’s
legislative prayer practice does not rise to the level of coercion.138
129. Id. at 510.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 512.
133. Id. at 513.
134. Id. at 514.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 515-16 (explaining that Justice Kennedy’s coercion test was only joined by two other
Justices and the Sixth Circuit’s panel was divided on whether “Justice Kennedy’s three-Justice plurality
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Similar to Town of Greece, the Sixth Circuit held the coercive effect of
prayers at board meetings to be no different from the effect of prayers at
legislative sessions.139 While the Fourth Circuit in Lund determined the
prayer to be in such a “close proximity” to the deliberation of individual
community member’s appeals, the Sixth Circuit cited Town of Greece’s
situation and the majority’s holding as rejecting these distinctions.140 In
addition, the “reasonable observer” familiar with the history and
tradition of legislative prayer would not see a preferential treatment of
one religion over another in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit.141 The Sixth
Circuit distinguished itself from Lund in this sense. The Sixth Circuit
recognized that in Lund the Fourth Circuit found excessive examples of
prayers “portraying non-Christians as ‘spiritual[ly] defect[ive]’ and
‘suggesting that other faiths are inferior.’”142 However, the Sixth Circuit
found no instances of harsh criticism against Jackson County’s citizens
or the plaintiff in this case.143
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
the commissioners’ request of attendees to rise and bow their heads was
coercive by showing preferential treatment or mandating
participation.144 The practice of requesting attendees to join in prayer in
this case is no different in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit than guest
ministers requesting in Town of Greece.145 Unlike the Fourth Circuit in
Lund who found these requests served only to marginalize attendees, the
Sixth Circuit viewed these requests approved by the majority in Town of
Greece as “commonplace” and “reflexive” requests that “do not alone
mandate participation.”146
In addition, the Sixth Circuit viewed the two commissioners turning
their backs during plaintiff’s complaints or the board choosing other
appointments to a board committee littered with other factors and

opinion or Justice Thomas’s two-Justice concurring opinion” controls on the question of coercion.
However, the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s challenge fails under both standards, and therefore
need not be resolved at this time).
139. Id. at 516.
140. Id.; see Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1851-52 (2014) (explaining the
distinction between a legislative floor session and an intimate town hall meeting, was one of the core
issues Justice Kagan had with the majority in Town of Greece).
141. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2017) (dismissing Justice
Thomas’s legal coercion test as inapplicable in the case at hand as the plaintiff only claimed societal
pressures under Justice Kennedy’s Town of Greece opinion)
142. Id. at 517-18 (quoting Lund v. Rowan City., N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2017)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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incidents regarding the plaintiff.147 The Sixth Circuit determined no
coercion present as there was no proof that the board acted prejudicially
against the plaintiff nor “allocated benefits and burdens” based on a
prejudice for not participating in the prayer.148 Importantly, the Sixth
Circuit reaffirmed Town of Greece’s holding that “[o]ffense…does not
equate to coercion,” and therefore, Jackson County did not betray an
impermissible government principle.149
III. ANALYSIS
The Fourth and Sixth Circuit applied the basic law of Marsh and
Town of Greece correctly. Both circuits agreed that legislator-led prayer
is not per se unconstitutional, and in certain circumstances may lie
within the historical and traditional legislative practices of this nation.
The split between the circuits does not lie in the application of law, but
in the Sixth Circuit’s mischaracterization of Town of Greece’s proper
holding. Town of Greece requires courts to look beyond the prayergiver’s identity to the intention behind giving the prayer.150 Sectarian
prayers are within the historical and traditional practices of legislative
prayer, so long as the prayer opportunity is not used to proselytize or
advance or disparage a particular faith. Another limitation upon the
prayer-giver’s intentions or motivations, is the prayers should not be
used for political divisiveness. These prohibited motivations are
identified by the Fourth Circuit quickly and are the reasons Rowan’s
prayer practice fell outside the bounds of historical and traditional
legislative prayer practices. However, the Sixth Circuit failed to identify
these obvious motivations, and moreover intentionally dismissed
evidence that illustrated the commissioners’ misuse of prayer through a
procedural ruling.
A. The Basic Law: Legislator-Led Prayer is Not Per Se Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court in Marsh and Town of Greece consistently held
that “it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is
permitted.”151 Yet, the question the Sixth and Fourth Circuit are
147. Id. (explaining plaintiff had brought suits against multiple individuals and elected officials
many times showing the dislike was not based on his religious beliefs, but antagonism towards him as a
person).
148. Id. at 518-19 (arguing that the plaintiff showed no proof to his belief that his rejection from
two committees was based on his complaint about prayer).
149. Id.
150. Corbin, supra note 66, at 301.
151. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
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confronted with is within this very realm: whether legislator-led prayer
fits within the historical and traditional practices followed in both
Congress and state legislatures. While the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’
holdings appear contradictory, the essence of the two cases is in perfect
harmony. Both circuits agree that legislator-led prayer is not per se
unconstitutional and can be within the historical and traditional
legislative prayer practices.152 The disagreements ensue between the
circuits on what weight should be given to the identity of the prayergiver in the "fact-sensitive" inquiry required by Town of Greece.153
However, a closer look illuminates that the circuits only disagree on the
consequences of potentially inconsistent results.
The Sixth Circuit believes "legislative prayer [should not be]
predicated on the identity of the speaker" because this would cause
inconsistent and ridiculous results.154 For example, if two identical
prayers were delivered in bordering counties, one prayer given by a
guest minister and the other by a legislator, the prayer given by the guest
minister would be held constitutional, while the prayer given by the
legislator would be struck down.155 The Fourth Circuit does not
necessarily disagree with the Sixth Circuit's view. The Fourth Circuit
admits that depending on the circumstances, prayer by legislators in one
instance may be constitutional and in another may be
unconstitutional.156 Nevertheless, in the Fourth Circuit's view, this
inconsistency is aligned with Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In
some situations sectarian prayer is unconstitutional, and in others
situations it is constitutional.157 Similar to sectarian prayers, the identity
of the prayer-giver is one of the relevant factors to consider in the "factsensitive" constitutional inquiry.158
From the lens of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Town of Greece, the
Supreme Court would agree with both circuits that legislator-led prayer
is not inherently unconstitutional and can fall within the historical and
traditional practices of legislative prayer. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court would likely side with the Fourth Circuit that the identity of the
prayer-giver, like sectarian prayers, is a relevant factor in the
constitutional inquiry. But Justice Kennedy would beg the courts to not
stop the analysis there. The courts must look beyond the prayer-giver’s

152. Lund v. Rowan City, N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. County of
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 509 (6th Cir. 2017).
153. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
154. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512.
155. Id.
156. Lund, 863 F.3d at 280.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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identity and evaluate the intentions and motivations of the prayer-giver
for leading the invocations. Recall Justice Kennedy's reference to
prohibited motivations in Town of Greece: "[a]bsent a pattern of prayers
that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible
government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of prayer
will not likely establish a constitutional violation."159 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy's reference suggests the importance of the prayer-givers
motivation behind giving the prayer. Is the prayer for the legislators to
call upon divine guidance or is the prayer to proselytize, to advance a
particular faith, or disparage another religion?
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Strategy: A Procedural Sidestep Around Town of
Greece’s True Holding
Both circuits apply the general law of Marsh and Town of Greece
correctly. Beginning with Marsh and Town of Greece's traditional and
historical practice analysis, the circuits determine legislator-led prayer is
not per se unconstitutional and, in some instances, falls within the
historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer. However,
legislator-led prayer has its limitations. Justice Kennedy emphasized in
Town of Greece that if the prayers proselytize, disparage a faith,
advance a particular faith, or betray an impermissible governmental
purpose, the prayer practice will fall outside the historical and traditional
legislative prayer practices of this nation.160 These limitations direct the
court's attention to the motivation behind the prayer-giver's invocations.
Once the motivation transforms from a practice to lend divine guidance
to an opportunity to proselytize, disparage, or advance a particular
religion, the legislative prayer is in direct conflict with the
Establishment Clause.
The discordance between the holdings of Lund and Bormuth lies
within the Sixth Circuit's mischaracterization of Town of Greece's true
holding: the purpose of prayer is to "lend gravity to the occasion and
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage,” as well as to "invoke
divine guidance in town affairs."161 Legislative prayer should not be
used to proselytize or disparage, or advance, one faith over another.
There is also a third purpose prayer should not be used for, political
divineness. The Supreme Court must heed Lemon's long ago warning
that political division along religious lines is a threat to the normal
political process, and thus the prayers should not be used as a political
wedge. Political divisiveness is an impermissible government purpose.
159. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1823.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1816, 1823.
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Therefore, if there is a motive behind the prayer-givers to create a
political community around religious divisions, then it would be outside
the historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer and forbidden
by the Establishment Clause.
The Sixth Circuit failed to understand that Town of Greece requires
the courts to go beyond the identity of the prayer-giver. Courts must
evaluate the prayer-giver's motive behind giving the invocation and
determine whether the prayer practice crosses the "line between
permissible and impermissible legislative prayer."162 The Fourth Circuit,
on the other hand, correctly identified the commissioners’ motives
behind the prayer practice. Not only were the prayers used to proselytize
and advance one religion over another, but the prayers were used to
cause divide within the community.163 At one particular meeting, an
individual who opposed the prayer practice was booed and mocked by
the audience.164 Moreover, the prayer practice was used as a campaign
platform by incumbents and challengers.165 This kind of conduct is
exactly what the majority in Lemon and Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion in Van Orden warned against.166
The Sixth Circuit majority strategically and intentionally ignored
Town of Greece's core principle and did not look beyond the prayergiver's identity to the motive of the prayer-giver. This strategic move
was not in the substance of the opinion, but within the procedural
history of the case. As stated above, the Sixth Circuit refused to
supplement the appellant record with facts preserved in video recordings
of the board commissioners’ meetings or take judicial notice of the
videos. This procedural note is vital because the videos contain strong
evidence that the board members’ motivations for giving the prayers
were outside the scope of Marsh and Town of Greece. The reason for
this is twofold. First, the Sixth Circuit held that under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c), Bormuth had “an affirmative duty to direct the
court’s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it
seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact,” and it failed to
do so.167 Second, the Sixth Circuit declined to take judicial notice of the
videos because of an apparent tension between judicial notice and the
need “to review the case presented to the district court, rather than a

162. Lund, 863 F.3d at 295.
163. Id. at 282-85.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971). Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703
(2005).
167. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Chicago
Title Ins. Corp v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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better case fashioned after a district court’s unfavorable order.”168
Regarding the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Sixth
Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to assist the district court in
understanding the facts within the videos.169 The Sixth Court pointed to
the party’s briefs, as well as the plaintiff’s complaint, to emphasize the
lack of presentation of any video evidence.170 However, the counsel for
the County even admitted, during oral arguments at the panel stage of
this case, that the official record includes all of the videos of the board
of commissioners’ meetings.171 Further, the plaintiff referenced the
videos in his amended complaint and the Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.172 Nevertheless, the Sixth
Circuit majority determined the plaintiff waived its opportunity to bring
the district court’s attention to those facts, and accordingly the Sixth
Circuit would not supplement the appellate record with these videos
either.
The Sixth Circuit also declined to take judicial notice of the videos.
While the Sixth Circuit may take judicial notice at any stage of the
proceeding under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Sixth Circuit
refused to do so based on a desire to avoid potential tension between
district and appellate courts.173 Yet this disregards the language of the
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c): “[t]he court . . . must take judicial
notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary
information.”174 The kinds of facts include facts that are not subject to
reasonable dispute.175 The facts within the videos were not subject to
reasonable dispute, as the majority even pointed out, because Jackson
County admitted the accuracy of these publicly-available videos.176
Moreover, there was not a present tension in this case between the
district and appellate courts, as the dissent correctly pointed out, because
the plaintiff directed the district court’s attention to the facts within
these videos in his amended complaint and in his Plaintiff’s Response to
the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.177

168. Id. at 501.
169. Id. at 499-500.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (requiring certain procedures for parties asserting
there is a genuinely disputed fact).
170. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 500.
171. Id. at 530-31.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 501.
174. Fed. R Evid. 201.
175. Id.
176. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 501.
177. Id. at 531.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss4/7

22

Gooder: Legislators Livin' on a Prayer: The Fourth and Sixth Circuits' Ap

2018]

TOWN OF GREECE AND LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER

1375

C. The Missing Videos: A Look Beyond the Prayer-Giver’s Identity
Within these video recordings was strong evidence that the board
members’ motivations for giving the prayers were not limited to calling
on divine guidance, but were also used to proselytize, advance one
religion over another, and create political divineness. For example, one
video uncovered that one of the boards’ commissioners prayed at every
meeting during a two year span, except for one meeting when no
citizens attended.178 Another video revealed the board of commissioners
exclusively giving the prayers at every meeting because they were
worried about "certain people com[ing] up here and say[ing] things that
they are not going to like."179 The board of commissioners wanted to
avoid "things that they [were] not going to like" and did not want to
"open a Pandora's Box" by allowing others to pray.180 These videos
exposed a pattern and underlying motive that the prayers led by the
commissioners were not intended for themselves, but were intended for
the citizens attending the meetings. The intention was to proselytize and
advance Christianity specifically, because Christian prayers were the
kinds of prayers they liked.
Further, the videos contradict the Sixth Circuit's argument that the
comments made by the commissioners were not directed at the plaintiff's
beliefs. One video reveals a commissioner calling the plaintiff a
"nitwit": "[i]t's taken some nitwit 200 and some years to come up with
an angle like this to try to deprive me or other people of my faith, of my
rights."181 Another video shows a commissioner characterizing this issue
as "political correctness nonsense" and stated the plaintiff has "political
correctness jammed down his throat."182 An event the Sixth Circuit did
take into consideration was when one commissioner turned his back to
the plaintiff when the plaintiff first expressed his objection to the
boards’ prayer practice. The Sixth Circuit brushed this aside, stating it
was not in reaction to the plaintiff's views, but to him bringing a lawsuit.
However, the commissioner turned his back when the plaintiff first
expressed his view about the prayer practice. Both the rhetoric in these
videos and the commissioners’ conduct demonstrate that the
commissioners were specifically distained by and wished to exclude the
178. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. United for Separation of Church and State In Support of
Appellant and Reversal at 10, 26, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F. 3d 494 (2017) (No. 15-1869).;
see November 6, 2014 Special Jackson County Board of Commissioners Meeting Video, YouTube (Nov.
7, 2014), http://tinyurl.com/2014nov6 (0:01–0:47).
179. County of Jackson, Personnel & Finance Committee November 12, 2013 Jackson County,
MI, YouTube (Dec. 19, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/2013nov12 (38:02-38:16).
180. Id. at 38:02-38:16, 46:51-47:25.
181. Id. at 43:30.
182. Id. at 43:00.
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plaintiff's minority beliefs.
The Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish itself from the Fourth
Circuit at this point; suggesting the Fourth Circuit in Lund had multiple
examples of opprobrium.183 Yet all of the above examples illustrate the
commissioners’ defamation against the plaintiff, before and after
litigation commenced, because of his minority view about the prayer
practice. While the Sixth Circuit wished to conceal the videos from the
record, there were still incidents the Sixth Circuit took into
consideration that point to the true motivation behind the
commissioners’ prayer practice. Two commissioners were reported in a
local newspaper stating "[Bormuth] is attacking us and, from my
perspective, my Lord and savior Jesus Christ. Our civil liberties should
not be taken away from us, as commissioners" and "[w]hat about my
rights?... If a guy doesn't want to hear a public prayer, he can come into
the meeting two minutes late."184 The Sixth Circuit viewed them as just
expressions about the commissioners’ right to offer prayer. Nonetheless,
even if the commissioners’ were only speaking about their rights, the
fact that the statements were published in the local newspaper and
people in the community knew who the plaintiff was, clearly caused a
community controversy and political division along religious lines.
Members of the community now are either for or against the legislative
prayer practice. Members are either an insider or an outsider.
Based on the facts within and outside of the appellate record, the
Jackson County Board of Commissioners clearly intended the prayers to
be a means to proselytize, advance Christianity, and create political
divisions within the community. The Sixth Circuit’s attempt to bury the
facts in a pile of procedural rulings does not change the obvious
motivations behind the legislator-led prayer. Unlike the Fourth Circuit,
the Sixth refused to follow Town of Greece’s requirement to look
beyond the prayers to the intentions of the prayer-giver. If Bormuth is
granted cert to the Supreme Court, the case will almost certainly be
found to be a mischaracterization of Town of Greece and flagrant
attempt to ignore facts relevant to the “fact-sensitive” inquiry.
V. CONCLUSION
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, and will continue to be, an
ongoing debate between courts. As justices transition in and out of the
Supreme Court, there is no doubt the ideology behind the Establishment
Clause will continue to shift. Nonetheless, during the current time, the

183. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 518 (6th Cir. 2017).
184. Id.
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Establishment Clause holds, at least in regards to legislative prayer, the
“fact-sensitive” inquiry must begin and end with a look behind the
prayers content and the prayer-giver’s identity to the motivations and
intentions of the prayer-giver or prayer policy. Marsh and Town of
Greece require courts to evaluate the intentions in light of the historical
and traditional practices of legislative prayer. And if the intentions for
the prayers consist of proselytizing, advancing, or disparaging a
particular religion or causing political divisiveness, then the Supreme
Court will find the prayer practice outside of the historical and
traditional legislative prayer practices of our nation.
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